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Abstract
This study investigates the association between the level of compliance of Australian listed
companies with Australian corporate governance principles, in aggregate, and the level of
discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model. It is hypothesised that higher levels of
compliance would be associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals. Data from a
random sample of 214 Australian listed companies for the years 2009 and 2010 were used to
test the hypothesis. The results demonstrate a significant negative relationship indicating that
companies with higher levels of compliance engage in lower levels of earnings management
via discretionary accruals.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In August 2007, the Australian Corporate Governance Council (ACGC) issued the second
edition of its Principles and Recommendations (ACGC-PR) for enhancing the corporate
governance structure of Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies. Australian
listed companies are required to prepare corporate governance statements that disclose the
extent of their compliance with these principles and recommendations using an “if not, why
not” approach that requires them to explain the circumstances underpinning their decision not
to comply with particular Principles or Recommendations. This study examines the level of
compliance by Australian listed companies with the ACGC-PR and investigates whether
companies with higher levels of compliance engage in lower levels of earnings management.
The focus is on the controlling function of the ACGC-PR through investigating the
association with accrual-based earnings management. This paper contributes to the earnings
management literature in two ways. First, prior research suggests that managers use
discretionary accruals to manage certain benchmarks such as the level of earnings (see
Dechow et al. 1995). This study demonstrates how corporate governance intervention
influences firms in the management of manage earnings benchmarks. In particular the study
results suggest that, post ACGC-PR, there is evidence of an association between a high level
of compliance with the principles and recommendations and a low level of earnings
management. Second, the ACGC-PR were designed to direct and control corporate
governance. Since the ACGC-PR represent a mechanism aimed at improving outcomes for
investors (referred to as ‘Principals’ within the agency theory paradigm), then investors have
incentives to identify and reward compliance with the ACGC-PR. The results in this study
suggest that the ACGC-PR is associated with a decrease in discretionary accrual actions by
high level compliers, and is arguably an effective method of addressing the agency problem.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an explanation of the
link between corporate governance mechanisms and the agency problem, while Section 3
provides a review of related literature and develops the hypothesis tested in this study. In
Section 4 the research method and sample selection approach are described, and the modified
Jones model is presented. In Section 5 the results are presented and discussed. Section 6
provides a conclusion and some implications for future research.
2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM
While there is no single generally accepted definition for corporate governance, a system by
which a company is directed and controlled (Cadbury 1992; Hodges, Wright & Keasey 1996)
appears to be the most common understanding proposed to describe corporate governance.
The focus of this study is on controlling role of corporate governance, as the study offers an
explanation for the link between corporate governance and the “agency problem” which is
attributed to the separation between managers and principals, the separation of levels of
management, and the conflicts of interest between managers and equity and debt holders
(Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; Dechow et al. 2012; Fama & Jensen 1983a,
1983b; Stolowy & Breton 2004).
Earnings management is the discretionary manipulation of earnings levels by managers.
Managers can choose from among the available accounting options to align their earnings
levels with their intentions (Stolowy & Breton 2004; Tucker & Zarowin 2006). Earnings
management manipulation occurs within the boundaries of accounting standards and the law.
The benchmark for distinguishing between the activities that constitute earnings management
and those that do not depends on the intentions of the manager choosing the accounting
standards (McVay 2006). Earnings management studies are predominantly based on the
assumption that managers behave opportunistically. Therefore, from the agency perspective
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regarding corporate governance, monitoring managers is considered a necessity (Benkel,
Mather & Ramsay 2006; Brennan 2008; Bugshan 2005; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent
2005; Koh 2003). According to this viewpoint, using corporate governance to improve the
internal and external control of managers (for example, by monitoring the board of directors)
may decrease opportunities for earnings management and improve the credibility of financial
information (Dey 2005; Rogers 2006). From a rational standpoint, earnings management is a
consequence of the agency problem and it can be mitigated by a good corporate governance
structure. In other words, good corporate governance principles and recommendations can be
considered a means of controlling managers in the realm of monitoring and bonding costs.
The major aim of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in
establishing its Principles of Good Corporate Governance is to mitigate the agency problem
that is caused by the separation of owners and managers (Sharar 2006). Previous research
suggests that firms with high residual agency losses attempt to mitigate these costs by
engaging in monitoring activities through a board or audit committee as part of an internal
corporate governance mechanism (Benkel, Mather & Ramsay 2006; Bugshan 2005; Chi et al.
2009; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005). Corporate governance exercises two
opposite effects on agency costs: it increases monitoring and bonding costs, and it decreases
residual losses. A pragmatic motive for implementing corporate governance practice is lied
under this assumption that benefits outweigh costs of implementation.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND STUDY HYPOTHESIS
While a large number of the studies of earnings management focus on the opportunistic use
of accruals, there are relatively few studies investigating the association between corporate
governance codes/ principles and earnings management resulting from the use of
discretionary accruals. A few studies have been conducted that examine overall compliance
levels with the Corporate Governance Codes in South Africa (Ntim et al. 2012), Romania
(Dănescu & Spătăcean 2011) and England (Selvaggi & Upton 2008). These studies did not
examine the link between the aggregate level of compliance with corporate governance
principles and earnings management practices. Chang and Sun (2009) used aggregate
corporate governance scores consisting of five corporate governance attributes
recommended in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) (SOX) to investigate the association
between overall corporate governance and earnings management for a sample of companies
in the United States (US). They argued that an optimal corporate governance structure is
formed by taking into account multiple complementary CG dimensions. To date, no study
has been located that has focused on the aggregate level of compliance with the ACGC-PR
and an association with earnings management.
This study examines the aggregate influence of 27 recommendations introduced under the
eight corporate governance principles. These principles that are discussed in this section
include: 1. management functions and oversight; 2. board structure; 3. ethics; 4. audit
committee, 5. timely and balanced disclosure; 6. rights of shareholders; 7. risk management;
and 8. remuneration. The study seeks to investigate the association between these attributes
(in aggregate) and earnings management. Prior research suggests that accruals are one of the
most commonly used proxies for earnings management (Benkel, Mather & Ramsay 2006;
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; DeAngelo 1986; Hsu & Koh 2005; Jones 1991;
Koh 2003; Kothari, Leone & Wasley 2005). Classification shifting within income statements
is another proxy for earnings management (Healy & Wahlen 1999). In addition, the timing of
sales, understating the cost of goods sold, and reducing discretionary expenses such as
research and development, advertising and some sales and administrative expenses have also
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been identified as proxies for real earnings management (Cohen, J, Krishnamoorthy &
Wright 2008; Fama & Jensen 1983b; Koh 2003; Patel, Balic & Bwakira 2002).
3.1 ACGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations
In this section the Principles and Recommendations proposed by the ACGC are discussed
briefly and the testable hypothesis for this study is developed.
3.1.1 Management functions and oversight (Principle 1) and earnings management
Principle 1 deals with the roles and responsibilities of boards and management. Companies
are encouraged to distinguish between ‘the functions reserved to the board and those
delegated to senior executives’ and disclose ‘the process for evaluating the performance of
senior executives’ (ACGC 2007, pp. 13-5). The OECD (2004) suggests that the purpose of
evaluating management performance is to enable shareholders to have access to ‘relevant
information on a timely and regular basis’ (Sharar 2006, p. 75). Feltham and Xie (1994)
argue that tying managers’ performance to their compensation can offer incentives for
managers to improve their performance and that it has become common to measure
managers’ performance using financial numbers (RiskMetrics 2010). Critically, when
performance is measured by financial numbers, there is an incentive for managers to
manipulate the numbers to earn more. Feltham and Xie (1994) propose multiple measures,
both performance-based and accounting-based, for evaluating performance. Patel, Balic and
Bwakira (2002) suggest that disclosing the senior executive functions and the process of
evaluating executive directors’ performance, recommended under Principle 1, is likely to
improve transparency and reduce information asymmetry. Further, Richardson’s (2000)
results indicate that greater levels of information asymmetry yield greater levels of earnings
management.
3.1.2 Board structure (Principle 2) and earnings management
Board structure (BS) is the focus of P2, which indicates that ‘companies should have a
board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its
responsibilities and duties’ (ACGC 2007, p. 16). The composition and size of boards of
directors have been broadly investigated by scholars for their impact on enhancing the
effectiveness of the boards’ monitoring role and in mitigating the agency problem (Bedard,
Chtourou & Courteau 2004; Bédard & Gendron 2010; Cheng & Warfield 2005; Cohen, J,
Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2008; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; Finnerty
1976; Jaffe 1974; Jensen 1993; Klein 2002b; Merchant & Rockness 1994; Xie, Davidson &
DaDalt 2003). A board’s effectiveness is also described as its ability to prevent managers
from making decisions that conflict with stakeholder interests (Jo & Kim 2007). The
composition of the board appears to be correlated with the likelihood that managers will
engage in earnings management (Lobo & Zhou 2001).
3.1.3 Ethics (Principle 3) and earnings management
Principle 3 seeks to encourage ethical promotion and responsible decision-making in
companies. It concentrates on the establishment of a code of conduct and on insider trading
policies, and indicates that ‘companies should actively promote ethical and responsible
decision making’ (ACGC 2007, p. 21). Disclosing ethical issues or adopting codes of
conduct are strongly supported by diverse participants including shareholders and boards
(Epstein, McEwen & Spindle 1994; Jongsureyapart 2006). Beneish and Vargus (2002)
examined whether insiders engage in income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings
management in order to benefit from buying and selling their own shares and found a
relationship between earnings management and abnormal insider trading. They identified
6

Safari, Mirshekary & Wise | Compliance with Corporate Governance Principles

overstated earnings in the years before instances of insider selling and decreases in income in
the years before instances of abnormal insider buying. Cheng and Warfield (2005) defend the
proposition that abnormal insider trading rises just prior to increasing share prices, which is
consistent with Beneish and Vargus’s (2002) findings. Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2005)
investigated the relationship between insider trading, earnings quality and the cost of capital.
They applied earnings quality as a proxy for information asymmetry and measured earnings
quality by discretionary accruals (DA) using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan &
Sweeney 1995).
3.1.4 Audit committee (Principle 4) and earnings management
Principle 4, ‘Safeguard integrity in financial reporting’ is focused on audit committee
characteristics, and the first Recommendation under this Principle suggests that ‘the
board should establish an audit committee’ (ACGC 2007, p. 25). The influence of various
characteristics of audit committees including the committee’s existence, the independence of
the committee directors, the presence of executive directors and individuals with financial
expertise on the committee and the committee’s meeting frequency and size, have been the
subject of numerous prior studies. Klein (2002a) demonstrated a significant negative
relationship between an independent member majority in audit committees and abnormal
accruals. Benkel, Mather and Ramsay (2006) asserted that a higher portion of independent
directors on audit committees yields diminutive levels of earnings management. Davidson,
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) provided evidence of a negative association between the
existence of an audit committee and a majority of non- executive director committee
members on reducing earnings management.
3.1.5 Timely and balanced disclosure (Principle 5) and earnings management
Principle 5 focuses on disclosure quality and accountability: ‘companies should promote
timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters concerning the company’ (ACGC
2007, p. 28). Two important aspects of disclosure considered in Principle 5 are
‘timeliness’ and the ‘nature’ of disclosure. The Principle states that the disclosures should
ideally be factual, objective and consist of all material information, and that the information
should eliminate the ‘surprise’ factor. In addition, the type of information, and who is in
charge of deciding about the disclosures must be provided, and the monitoring of compliance
are issues that must be considered in a companies’ continuous disclosure policies. Prior
research suggests that reducing information asymmetry is one of the potential benefits of
disclosure (Lang & Lundholm 1996; Lobo & Zhou 2001). Jo and Kim (2007) support the
notion that entities with extensive and frequent disclosure are less likely to engage in
earnings management due to reducing information asymmetry and enhancing transparency.
Dye (1988) introduces information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and
between investors and prospective investors as two factors that generate earnings
management. Similarly, Richardson (2000) showed a significant positive association between
information asymmetry levels and earnings management. Hirst and Hopkins (1998) and
Hunton, Libby and Mazza (2006) argue that detecting earnings management will be
facilitated by providing more transparent disclosure that enhances financial analysts’
judgments.
3.1.6 Rights of shareholders (Principle 6) and earnings management
Under Principle 6, enhancing and exercising the rights of shareholders is considered a good
corporate governance practice. Principle 6 states: ‘companies should respect the rights of
shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of those rights’ (ACGC 2007, p. 31). In
Principle 6, companies are encouraged to design a communication strategy that promotes
7
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effective communication with shareholders and to promote participation at general meetings
(ACGC 2007, p.30).
The association between the rights of shareholders and earnings management has been a
controversial subject; with conflicting results emerging. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (1988)
compare earnings management activities in 31 countries. They identify several country-level
characteristics that they suggest, have reduced earnings management: a “developed equity
market, dispersed ownership structure, strong investors’ rights and legal enforcement”. In
contrast, Martin (2001; 2003) suggests that strong shareholder rights may result in greater
earnings management as there are internal and external demands that lead to earnings
management. Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2007), and Liu and Lu (2007) introduce conflicts of
interest between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders as a leading cause of
earnings management in China. Liu and Lu (2007) provide evidence supporting the role of
good corporate governance on constraining agency conflicts between minority shareholders
and controlling shareholders and eventually on mitigating earnings management.
3.1.7 Risk management (Principle 7) and earnings management
Principle 7 states that ‘companies should establish a sound system of risk oversight and
management and internal control’ (ACGC 2007, p. 12). Opportunistic behaviour may
influence risk-related decisions among managers, especially when the compensation that
managers receive includes bonuses that are based on reported earnings. For instance Mayers
and Smith (1982) suggested that managers may prefer to postpone expenditure, including that
associated with insurance which is considered to decrease risk, until a time at which they may
no longer be working with the company based on their contracts. The influence of internal
audit as a component of a corporate governance structure which reduces earnings
management is apparent in some studies (for example in Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent
2005). Further, disclosing risk management policies is expected to mitigate earnings
management by improving transparency and decreasing information asymmetry.
3.1.8 Remuneration (Principle 8) and earnings management
Principle 8 states that ‘companies should ensure that the level and composition of
remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its relationship to performance is clear’
(ACGC 2007, p. 35), and it contains a recommendation that a board establish a remuneration
committee with responsibility for recruitment, termination policies, incentives and
frameworks for superannuation arrangements (ACGC 2007). Bergstresser and Philippon
(2006) suggest that some payment structures that are supposed to enhance company
performance motivate managers to manipulate their earnings to increase their compensation.
Their findings indicate that when manager remuneration is tied to share prices, the manager
will engage in earnings management in an attempt to change the price of the company’s
stock. Main and Johnston (1993) define the primary task of remuneration committees as
establishing payment policies based on corporate performance. However, they argue that
compensation is higher when a remuneration committee is in place but that there is no effect
on the incentive structure of pay. Klein (2002a) evinces the positive relationship between a
CEO sitting on a remuneration committee and a higher level of earnings management.
3.2 Hypothesis Tested In This Study
Investigating the association between the extent of compliance with aggregate corporate
governance principles and recommendations and earnings management leads to the
development of the study’s hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1 (H1):

Companies with higher levels of aggregate compliance with the
ACGC-PR will exhibit lower levels of discretionary accruals (DA).

4 DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLING
To test the hypothesis for the study, stratified random sampling is conducted using all of the
ASX listed companies except for financial companies and those that belong to industries with
fewer than 10 firms. Consistent with prior research, firms in the financial sector were
eliminated in this study since due to their nature (Bugshan 2005) and unique working capital
structure (Davidson, Goodwin- Stewart & Kent 2005), it is difficult to estimate discretionary
and non-discretionary accruals for firms in this sector (Klein 2002a). The requirement for
eliminating industries with less than 10 firms was introduced in prior research by Peasnell,
Pope and Young (2000) who claim that elimination of these industries is necessary to
estimate the specific parameters of the non-discretionary accruals models for each industryyear.
The Bloomberg database is used to collect the financial data that are necessary to calculate
the accruals. The primary population for this study is the 1,886 listed companies included in
the Bloomberg database for 2009 and 2010. After financial companies and those in industries
with fewer than 10 firms have been excluded, 1,619 companies in total remain in the
population (refer to Table 1). This population of 1,619 listed companies is used to compute
the coefficients of the modified Jones model using a cross-sectional approach, and to
calculate discretionary and non-discretionary accruals (used as a proxy for earnings
management). For the hypothesis testing, a sample of 107 companies and 214 firm-year
observations is randomly selected. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the percentage of
the compliance of the primary sample companies with each ACGC-PR. These percentages
are based on the number of recommendations that are relevant to each principle and that the
company complies with. The numbers are then converted into percentages based on the total
number of recommendations within each principle.

Table 1: Summary of the sample by industry groups
N

Description
ASX-listed companies (24 industries)

1886

Eliminate: Companies in the financial industries (4 industries)

(262)

Eliminate: Industries with less than 10 companies (3 industries)
Population (17 industries)

(5)
1619

Final sample companies

107

Firm-year observations 2009–2010

214

9
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Table 2: Descriptive statics for level of compliance with corporate governance principles
2009a

Corporate

2010a

Pooled 2009 and 2010b

governance
principle

Min%

Max%

Mean%

Min%

Max%

Mean%

Min%

Max%

Mean%

P1

0

100

95.9

0

100

95.2

0

100

95.6

P2

17

100

65.7

17

100

66.1

17

100

65.9

P3

67

100

99.2

67

100

98.9

67

100

99.1

P4

0

100

72.4

0

100

72.6

0

100

72.6

P5

50

100

99.0

50

100

98.6

50

100

98.8

P6

0

100

96.0

0

100

96.7

0

100

96.4

P7

25

100

93.8

25

100

95.2

25

100

94.5

P8

0

100

80.9

0

100

81.1

0

100

81.0

TOTCOM

40.7

100

84.4

40.7

100

84.6

40.7

100

84.5

a. N = 107 (2009), (2010); b. N = 214 (2009 & 2010).

5 RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Multiple regression models were used to test the research hypothesis that companies with
higher levels of compliance with ACGC-PR will exhibit lower levels of discretionary
accruals (earnings management). The independent variable is the level of compliance of each
firm-year observation with 27 recommendations under the eight corporate governance
principles. The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals measured
using the modified Jones model. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) compared Jones, the
modified Jones and the Industry models and concluded that the most powerful model for
measuring discretionary accruals is the modified Jones model. This model has since been
commonly used to calculate discretionary accruals (see for example Bowman & Navissi
2003, and Cohen, Dey & Lys 2008) and is adopted in this study as a measure to separate the
discretionary portion of accruals from non-discretionary accruals. To find the discretionary
accruals it is necessary to calculate total accruals and non-discretionary accruals. In the next
two subsections the calculation of total accruals and non-discretionary accruals is explained.
5.1 Evaluation of Total Accruals
The balance sheet approach is commonly used to calculate total accruals (Bowman & Navissi
2003; Bugshan 2005; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; Kothari, Leone & Wasley
2005). Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables that are required to
calculate the total accruals using a balance sheet approach for the 2009-10 using the
following model:
TA t = (ΔCAt - ΔCASHt - ΔCLt + ΔSTLt – DEPt)
Where:
TA
=Total accruals
ΔCAt =Changes in current assets
Δ CASHt
=Changes in cash and cash equivalents
Δ CLt =Changes in current liabilities
Δ STLt =Changes in the short-term portion of long-term liabilities
DEPt =Amount of depreciation and amortisation
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For 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively, the average total assets are $492.3 million, $510
million and $530.8 million (Table 3). For the 1,619 companies in the population, the average
cash and cash equivalents for 2008, 2009 and 2010 are $31.4 million, $46.8 million and $50.1
million, respectively.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics—total accruals
Mean*

Minimum*

Maximum*

Median* Std. deviation*

A8(2008)

492.289

.003

89616

18.512

3624.95

A9 (2009)

510.008

.000

97236

16.921

3814.23

A10 (2010)

530.759

.000

112402

18.975

4167.63

CA8

128.554

.000

21680

7.341

868.21

CA9

131.386

.000

22486

5.253

918.27

CA10

134.447

.000

25134

6.061

994.00

CASH8

31.420

–.014

4237

3.595

180.69

CASH9

46.828

–.000

10833

2.695

363.35

CASH10

50.092

–2.450

12456

3.117

448.64

CL8

109.666

.000

22100

1.740

857.68

CL9

94.920

.000

11850

1.643

584.34

CL10

91.231

.000

13042

1.972

621.92

Δ STL9

–8.992

-9187

2955

.000

284.95

Δ STL10

–4.354

-2936

1333

.000

153.38

DEP9

19.683

.000

4390

.143

185.50

DEP10

20.039

.000

4732

.133

196.45

TA9

–24.356

–7381

1558

–.194

258.85

TA10

–21.838

–7381

636

–.179

266.82

* $m., before applying outlier tests
TAt = (Δ CAt – Δ CASHt – Δ CLt + Δ STLt – DEPt)

5.2 Evaluation of Non-discretionary Accruals
To calculate non-discretionary accruals using the modified Jones regression model (below
formula), the industry year-specific parameters are needed. There are two methods to
compute the industry year-specific parameters: the time-series and cross-sectional approaches
(Benkel, Mather & Ramsay 2006; Bugshan 2005; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005;
Dechow, P.M., Sloan & Sweeney 1995; Dey 2005; Koh 2003; Scott 1997). The time-series
approach uses firm-specific parameters instead of industry-specific parameters and assumes
that firm-specific parameters do not vary over time (Bowman & Navissi 2003; Bugshan
2005). This approach uses a lower number of observations and generates a smaller sample
compared with the cross-sectional approach (Subramanyam, 1996). Under the more generally
used cross-sectional approach, industry-time specific parameters are estimated assuming that
these coefficients are the same for firms in the same industry-year (ACGC 2007; Bugshan
2005; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Peasnell, Pope & Young 2000; Stolowy & Breton 2004).
11
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Using a cross-sectional approach, the first regression of a modified Jones model is run
separately for each industry-year to estimate the mentioned parameters (Watts & Zimmerman
1990).
Modified Jones Model
TA t / At-1 = α1 (1 /At-1) + α2 (ΔREV t/At-1) + α3 (PPE t / At-1) + et
Where:
TA
= Total accruals
A
= Total assets
ΔREV = Changes in revenue
PPE = Gross property, plants and equipment
Total accruals presented in Table 3 were applied in the modified Jones model to calculate the
industry-year specific parameters. Tables 4 and 5 provide a summary of the descriptive
statistics for the industry-year specific parameters that are estimated using a modified Jones
model. The positive mean of α2 and the negative mean of α3 obtained for both 2009 and 2010
are consistent with the results of prior research and confirm the usefulness of the modified
Jones model in categorising total accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals.
The average R2 values for the 17 industries are 0.35 and 0.29 for the years 2009 and 2010
respectively.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for estimating specific coefficients for 2009 using the
modified Jones model
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Median

Std. deviation

R2

0.353

0.018

0.830

0.252

0.272

α1

13865.72

–689443.00

1583978.65

–16869.86

497592.10

α2

0.094

–0.106

0.465

0.057

0.158

α3

–0.086

–0.352

0.129

–0.065

0.126

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for estimating specific coefficients for 2010 using the
Modified Jones model
Mean
0.291

Minimum
0.030

Maximum
0.820

Median
. 1930

Std. deviation
0.234

α1

–32795.81

–795343.53

692283.09

10341.91

381901.00

α2

0.004

–0.420

0.330

0.023

0.186

α3

–0.019

–0.190

0.270

-0.031

0.130

R

2

After estimating specific industry-year parameters, those parameters were applied to calculate
the non-discretionary proportion of total accruals for each firm-year using the following
formula:
NDA t= α1 (1 /At-1) + α2 [ΔREV t- ΔREC t) /At-1] + α3 (PPE t / At-1),
Where:
NDA = Non-discretionary accruals
A
= Total assets
ΔREV = Changes in revenue
ΔREC = Changes in net receivables
PPE = Gross property, plants and equipment
12
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The final stage in applying the modified Jones model was to calculate the discretionary
accruals by deducting the non-discretionary accruals from total accruals using the following
formula:
DAt = TA t / At-1 - NDAt
Where:
DA
= Discretionary accruals
TA
= Total accruals
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for calculating discretionary accruals*
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Median

Std. deviation

TA9 / At-1

–5.55

138.33

0.09

–0.02

3.92

TA10 / At-1

–38.57

106.03

0.02

–0.02

3.36

NDA9
NDA10
DA9
DA10
absDA9

–1.02
–2.17
–5.64
–3.64
0.00

0.78
3.51
1.72
2.32
5.64

–0.02
0.10
–0.04
–0.12
0.12

–0.01
0.00
–0.02
–0.03
0.07

0.10
0.48
0.28
0.51
0.26

absDA10

0.00

3.64

0.25

0.09

0.46

N = 1619
*Before applying outlier tests

5.3 Independent Variable –Compliance with the ACGC-PR
The aggregate compliance with ACGC-PR was calculated by counting the number of
recommendations a company followed out of the 27 available and converting the count into a
percentage. The regression model developed to test the hypothesis is as follows:
DA j= γ0 + TOTCOMt + γ8SIZEjt + LEVjt + ABSNIBEjt + PBRjt + ABSCHjt + εj
Where:
DA
= Absolute value of discretionary accruals
TOTCOM
= Total compliance with Australian corporate governance principles and
recommendations (Percentage)
SIZE
= Log of total assets
LEV
= Leverage, ratio of total liabilities to total assets
ABSNIBE
= Absolute value of net income
PBR
= Price to book ratio of equity
ABSCH
= Absolute changes in income
The selection of control variables model included in the model is informed by a review of
relevant literature. In testing the association between discretionary accruals and corporate
governance factors Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) examine seven control
variables: (1) size (log of total assets); (2) leverage (i.e., total liabilities divided by total
assets); (3) equity ratios; (4) the absolute value of net income (a proxy for absolute net
income before extraordinary items are divided by the total assets); (5) absolute changes in net
income (a proxy for the absolute changes in income deflated by the total assets); (6) extreme
performance (performance as measured by the net income divided by the total assets); and,
(7) the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. They were unable to identify
significant relationships between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and either
extreme performance or the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. However,
they provide evidence that the other control variables are significantly associated with the
13
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absolute value of discretionary accruals. All of the statistically significant control variables
mentioned in Davidson et al. (2005) are adopted in the current study.
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the regression model that investigated the effect of
the level of compliance of the study sample of companies with ACGC-PR on the level of
discretionary accruals. The model controls for the effect of five control variables. Descriptive
statistics are provided for one dependent variable (discretionary accruals), one independent
variable (compliance with ACGC-PR) and five control variables (size, leverage, the absolute
value of net income, the price to book ratio of equity, and the absolute change in income).
The minimum and maximum absolute values of the discretionary accruals for the sample
companies are .00 and 0.44, respectively. The minimum rate of compliance in this study is
40.74%, and the maximum and mean are 100% and 85.29%, respectively. In Table 8, the
Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables is presented. The
results demonstrate a positive and significant correlation between size and the level of
compliance.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics
Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std. deviation

0.00

0.44

0.09

0.09

40.74

100.00

85.29

11.87

LEV

0.00

1.21

0.249

0.24

SIZE

5.62

9.87

7.49

0.78

ABSNIBE

0.00

1.29

0.22

0.27

ABSCH

0.00

1.82

0.18

0.27

PBR

-3.66

10.36

1.88

1.82

absDA
TOTCOM%

*

* TOTCOM is the aggregate compliance with the CGPR.

Table 8: Pearson correlation matrix between the independent variables
N = 182
TOTCOM
SIZE
LEV
ABSNIBE
ABSCH
PBR

TOTCOM
Pearson

SIZE

LEV

ABSNIBE ABSCH

PBR

1

Sig.
Pearson

.532**

1

Sig.
Pearson

.000
.338**

.344**

.000

.000

**

–.467**

.027

1

.001
–.126

.000
–.315**

.715
.057

.375**

Sig.

.089

.000

.446

.000

Pearson

.086

-.079

.085

.382**

.152*

Sig.

.247

.286

.253

.000

.041

Sig.
Pearson
Sig.
Pearson

–.237

1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
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In Table 9 the regression results are reported. Overall, the model is significant (F = 11.115,
p<.01) and explains 27.6% of the variance in the dependent variable, DA (R2 =.276). The
explanatory level of variation generated by the model is consistent with prior studies (see
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005). The coefficient for total compliance is
significantly negative (-.001, p< .05). Therefore, the hypothesis is supported. The coefficient
for size (proxied by the log of total assets) is also negative and significant (-.024, p <.05),
which is consistent with prior research. Finally, the coefficient for leverage is positive and
significant (0.169, p< .001).
Table 9: Multiple regression results and coefficients
DA j= γ0 + γ1 TOTCOMjt + γ2SIZEjt + γ3LEVjt + γ4ABSNIBEjt + γ5ABSCHjt + γ6PBR + εj
Unstandardised coefficients
B

Std. error

.318

.078

–.001

.001

LEV

.169

SIZE

Constant

Standardised
co-efficients

t-stat

p-value

Beta
4.060

.000

–.163

–2.076

.039

.029

.426

5.916

.000

–.024

.011

–.198

–2.230

.027

ABSNIBE

–.061

.029

–.175

–2.134

.034

ABSCH

.074

.025

.210

2.984

.003

PBR

.012

.004

.228

3.185

.002

Governance variable:
TOTCOM
Control variables:

R

2

.276

F statistics 11.115
p-value

.000

6 CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study used a quantitative analysis approach and hypothesised that higher levels of
compliance with corporate governance principles and recommendations, would be associated
with lower levels of discretionary accruals. The modified Jones model was adopted as a
measure to estimate discretionary accruals. Data relating to compliance with ACCG-PR were
collected directly from corporate governance statements within the annual financial reports of
sample companies. Other financial data were collected from an external secondary source
(the Bloomberg database). Although compliance with the ACGC-PR are not mandatory,
Australian listed companies are required to prepare corporate governance statements
disclosing the extent of their compliance and to explain the circumstances underpinning their
decisions not to follow the ACGC-PR.
The study hypothesis is supported by the data, that is, higher levels of compliance with
ACGC-PR are associated with lower levels of earnings management. The five control
variables that are tested in the current study are size, leverage, the absolute value of net
income before extraordinary items, the price to book ratio of equity and the absolute changes
in income. Findings demonstrate that all control variables are significantly associated with
the levels of discretionary accruals. The results reveal that larger companies exhibit higher
15
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levels of compliance with ACGC-PR and will exhibit lower levels of discretionary accruals.
Leverage is also positively associated with the level of discretionary accruals.
In this study, discretionary accruals is measured using a modified Jones model and a crosssectional approach is used. The implications of other models for the measurement of
discretionary accruals are beyond the scope of this study. Some of the requirements of
Australian corporate governance are already embedded in the listing rules of the ASX and it
would be useful to control the influence of such requirements on earnings management in
future studies. One of the aims of good corporate governance is to mitigate residual losses,
thus future studies examining factors that create residual losses and investigating how
corporate governance structures can mitigate those factors would also be useful.
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